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Contents

Editorial Paragraphs 53

Leading Editorials
- An Alliance with Great Britain 56
- "Plumb Insane" 58
- Constitution-Making 59
- A Leader of Humanity 60

General Articles
- America's Part Among Nations ..... George Louis Beer 62
- Advice to China ..... Sinologue 64
- The Hope of the Minimum Wage ..... Learned Hand 66
- The Strike in South Wales ..... Harrison Smith 68
- Chicago: an Etching ..... Joseph Husband 70
- The German Losses ..... Gerald Morgan 71

Verse 72

After the Play ..... Q. K. 74

A Communication: A Pacifist's Apology ..... Washington Gladden 75

Correspondence 76

MANY shrewd political observers are predicting that the Democratic party is destined to break on the issue of "preparedness." Certain indications undoubtedly point in that direction. Mr. Bryan has not accepted the President's policy, and he is likely to carry with him so many Democratic members of the House that Mr. Wilson will be forced to depend on Republican votes for the passage of his measures. The Republicans will certainly use the advantage of their position for the purpose either of acquiring a little party capital, or of emphasizing the schism among their opponents. They can insist on amendments which if accepted will make the Republicans jointly responsible with the Democrats for military preparation, and if rejected will prevent the legislation from passing. In the former case the Bryan democracy will be still further alienated, and in the latter the administration will have failed without being able to place responsibility for the failure exclusively on Republican shoulders. All this is plausible, but it cannot be accepted as true until the extent of the revolt among the Democrats is disclosed. They will be urged by unusually powerful reasons to stand by the administration and so improve their chances of victory in the coming election. They may or may not succumb to these arguments. This will depend largely on the energy and passion which Mr. Bryan puts into his fight against military preparedness. He holds the key to the situation, just as he did at the time of Mr. Wilson's nomination and election. The political pressure exerted on Mr. Bryan not to carry the fight too far will be enormous. On the other hand, Mr. Bryan's attachment to an interpretation of Christianity which absolutely condemns all war and all preparation for war is absolute and unequivocal. Can he resist the temptation to serve the Prince of Peace by doing all in his power to keep this country free from the dominion of the lords of war? Perhaps, but we do not believe that he will.

NOTHING can be done about the sinking of the Ancona except to await the report of the investigation undertaken by American consular officials. The account furnished by the Austrian government controverts all the accusations made by the Italian government. An exhaustive and disinterested inquiry should establish the facts; and until the facts are established, no decision can be reached and advice as to the decision is gratuitous. In one respect only can the course which the American government ought to adopt be called clear. If the Ancona did not attempt to escape, this country cannot begin all over again with Austria-Hungary the controversy which it is supposed to have settled with Germany. The principles for which it stands have been declared to all the belligerents explicitly and publicly. An Austrian submarine must be held to an accountability for their violation no less strict and no less immediate than that which would be applied to a German.

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IF we are to believe one-tenth of what is reported in the press about the activities of German agents in this country, we must conclude that the German government conceives of our political and social organization as analogous to that of a Balkan or an oriental state. In such inchoate political systems it is not regarded as improper for a political party to accept the financial support of a foreign government. In Greece, for example, there are political forces working for the Central Powers and other political forces working for the Allies. German or Allied agents may go about the country openly and entertain social and pecuniary relations with local politicians of influence, without even compromising the political future of the latter. If Greece were an industrial state, foreign money would openly foster strikes, blow up manufacturing plants and wreck railways, as well as overturn ministries, mobilize or demobilize armies, render solemn treaties null and void. Such activities, we repeat, would seem to be legitimately undertaken in a Balkan state. But is not a foreign government mistaking our temper when it assumes that similar activities will prove fruitful here? A powder-mill or steel works may be put out of business, a strike may be arranged, the supplies required by a munitions plant may be tied up. Be it confessed, our police organization is not adapted for the suppression of this kind of disorder. But eventually we shall get rid of it, most likely at the cost of seriously restricting the free movement and the profitable employment of many innocent sympathizers of Germany. And new munitions plants are likely to spring up, two for each one destroyed. There is a long war still ahead of Germany, and she cannot afford for small momentary gains to exacerbate the anti-German feeling in any neutral country, even the United States.

THERE is very good reason why a country at war should endeavor to exert influence upon neutrals. It was the right and duty of the German statesmen to attempt to prevent the placing of the industrial and financial resources of the United States at the disposal of the Allies. How much American munitions and Anglo-French loans will count for in the end it is impossible to say, but the Germans are not inclined to minimize their importance. Now there was one influence that might legitimately have been brought to bear upon us: publicity. Few believe that the German cause has been as skilfully presented in this country as that of the Allies. It is doubtful that any enterprise in publicity, however skilfully conducted, could have wholly counteracted the effect of the invasion of Belgium; still, a competent presentation of the German cause, either purely voluntary or openly subsidized, might have had the effect of increasing materially the strength of the minority who would prefer that we made no profits out of the war. From another point of view it would have been good policy for the German government to address itself seriously to the question of publicity. It would then have gained a clearer insight into the real cost of such undertakings as the sinking of the Falaba, the Lusitania, the Ancona, or the execution of Miss Edith Cavell. Millions in publicity would be required to counteract the effect upon Americans of any one of those incidents.

THE ill-success which has attended British military operations during the past six months is usually attributed to the muddling of the Cabinet; but it is looking more and more as if the responsibility for the British failure must be fastened on the military rather than the political officials. The political leaders have neither interfered with the management of the war by the military experts, nor imposed upon the generals and the staff officers difficult and impossible tasks merely for political purposes. The truth seems to be that the government has been badly served by the heads of its army. There has been no adequate staff organization either for the army as a whole or for its separate units. The major operations have not been planned by men who were competent to anticipate the full difficulties of such a job as the attack on Constantinople, and who were capable of organizing success. On several occasions the British seem to have been on the verge of a decisive victory only to fail because of defective preparation. All accounts agree that at Suvla Bay the carrying out of the attack by the staff of the field commander was fatally inept, in that the troops were left in an arid district without a sufficient supply of water. From the Chief of the War Office down to the brigade commanders there has been a lack of technical knowledge and ability—a lack so widely distributed that the responsibility cannot be fastened on individuals, but must be attributed to the system. The British have always had too much confidence in the well-intentioned, well-born and well-dressed amateur. Their army has been officered by men whose qualifications were more often social than technical, and its failures prove that in modern war courage, tenacity, and sheer fighting ability are no sufficient substitute for knowledge, concentration and brains.

AS the death of Dr. Booker T. Washington reminds us, the negro in the South needs industrial training more than anything else, but industrial training is not enough. It is equally necessary that some few negroes should be furnished with an opportunity for more advanced studies. It

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is equally necessary that men should be trained who are capable of acting as leaders for the communities of negroes in the South. The most prominent institution devoted primarily to this work is Fisk University. Fisk has gradually grown from very small beginnings until it is fairly well equipped for its work. The practical nature of that work is indicated by the fact that of its graduates sixty-four per cent become teachers and twenty-four per cent professional and business men. It has recently inaugurated a new president, Dr. Fayette Avery McKenzie; and its friends confidently hope that under its new and energetic director it will grow still more rapidly and will be able the better to meet the grave responsibility of supplying intellectual leadership for so many million people. Its great necessity is a larger plant and a larger income. Its graduates obtain employment (without difficulty) in the work of teaching or giving professional advice to their fellow negroes, and if there were twice as many of them, the supply would remain inadequate to the demand.

AT regular intervals some heavy-headed citizen makes moan over the discovery that public libraries are circulating fiction. A recent bulletin from the New York Public Library recalls that this grievance is antique. It quotes an old-time custodian of the Astor Library who complained that his generation was busy consuming "the trashy, as Scott, Cooper, Dickens." This asceticism of the bookworm is scouted by the present spokesman of the New York Public Library. Of all books, he contends, "novels are among the last which a public library should relinquish." This is the wise view. If it is proper for the taxpayers to pay for tulips and kangaroos and elephants, to keep up municipal playgrounds and recreation piers, it is equally proper for them to provide imaginative literature. A library ought not to be a strict parallel to the activities in street-cleaning, water and light. And there is something even to be said for a popular standard in novels for circulation. A classic is usually a bare book in the eyes of the uninitiated. Most people who go on to the classics began by being tempted by the gaudier flies.

IT cannot be repeated too often that the essence of preparedness is a definition of foreign policy. Unless a government knows what it is going to defend, it cannot be said to have a program of national defense. How very practical a consideration this is may be seen from the following illustration. The Monroe Doctrine assumes that no European Power is to acquire any more colonies in this hemisphere. It is often suggested that Germany has designs on the southern portion of Brazil. Clearly we cannot know what armament we need till we have made up our minds whether Germany has such designs, and if she has, whether we should oppose them. Southern Brazil is farther from us than it is from Germany. Do we mean to build a navy capable of defending Brazil? If we do we probably need a different type of ship than if the zone of operations is to be limited, say, to the north Atlantic and the Caribbean. How much may we depend upon the South American republics to safeguard their own territory, and are we taking steps toward a diplomatic and military understanding with them?

THE gravity of the issues involved makes one wonder at times whose official duty it is to think out the grand strategies of American defense. It is not enough to know that the Secretary of the Navy is going to buy half a billion dollars' worth of ships, that the Secretary of War is ready to train and equip a certain number of troops. For any effective use of this armament, the State Department, the army, the navy, the merchant marine, the railroads, the munitions plant, the food supplies, must be coördinated and centralized sufficiently to insure their working together on some plan which has been already thought out. It may be that we shall have to create some kind of council of defense where all the needed services are represented. To let the State Department go its way, the navy its way, the army a different way, means disaster. Ships and guns unless they are instruments of a policy are waste and delusion. Let the advocates of panic preparedness take a lesson from Germany. The best-equipped military power the world has ever seen has failed to win this war. Why? Not because the German army was not superb, but because German diplomacy loaded that army with too great a task.

IN order to understand the present political situation in the near East and the grave difficulties with which English and French diplomacy have been faced in their attempt to secure Balkan support, one all-important consideration must be kept in mind. When the Triple Entente became an alliance it was inevitable, for good and for evil, that Russia should be the dominant Power in the East. She was bent on acquiring Constantinople, and it is this secular ambition of hers which really has governed the whole movement of Eastern politics since the war broke out. Here was the prime reason why Turkey could not remain neutral, though in the end it required the guns of the Goeben to bring the Young Turks boldly over the line. Here too is the reason why Rumania hesitates, and Bulgaria makes what seems a suicidal sacrifice of her independence. She might have been induced to

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break her head against the Tchataldja lines in order to set up a neutral state in Constantinople. She would not do it to install Russia. As things are, she may get her great extension of territory and she may keep it, at the cost of evolving from a democratic peasant state into an empire ridden by militarism. But her independence is gone. She will be henceforward a road in the German strategical system, a satellite tied by treaty and tariff to the Central Powers, as impotent to modify the policy of Prussia as Bavaria is to-day. She has steered into this with her eyes open in order to avoid Russian annexation of Constantinople. She has fled from the familiar danger of the past, with scant appreciation of the far clearer danger of the future. Because she dreaded and had experienced Russian encroachments on her independence she will not pause to reflect what the German encroachments must be. It is a ghastly tragedy, which may prove to be the decisive event of the war, but it is futile to place the blame on Downing Street. The British Foreign Office was fatally hampered by the ambitions of Petrograd.

THE average American is slow to believe that the foreign policy of the United States is domineering. It is just as well on that account to listen to an unsympathetic outsider. "The United States, by annexing the Philippines and the Sandwich Islands and taking control of Cuba, established herself as an aggressive Power of the first rank. By maintaining the Monroe Doctrine she arrogates to herself in addition the protectorate over the whole of North and South America. Now she is beginning to pose as a sort of dictator-at-large with reference to the rights of the British navy under international law." These are the words of an Englishman, H. M. Hyndman. The only thing the United States seems to lack in his eyes is apparently a spiked helmet and a Kultur. Mr. Hyndman has too many years of bellicosity behind him to have his words weigh heavily, but until we define for ourselves the policy behind our preparedness, we may expect such accusations of arrogance and aggression.

PRESIDENT WILSON recently had a letter from Andorra congratulating him upon his diplomatic victories and expressing a willingness to join in a peace conference. As the White House has a good map, the President was not long in doubt as to the location of his warm admirer. Furthermore, the man who brought the letter gave his word that Andorra was in the Pyrenees when he left. It is the Tom Thumb of all republics, having been inaccessible and independent since the time of Charlemagne. To be sure there is a road leading up from Spain, but avalanches frequently fall upon it and sever relations between the two countries. Andorra has fewer than six thousand people, but they are a hardy race and the nation never loses any sure-footed citizens, the careless ones having long since fallen into France or Spain. The capital city is larger than Amos, West Virginia, but it will probably never catch up with Amana, Iowa. The nation has no standing army and no troubles of any kind except a house of representatives. The president gets a salary of two cheeses, two capons and a ham from each of the six states; otherwise the people live on terms of complete equality.

An Alliance with Great Britain

ELSEWHERE in this issue Mr. George Louis Beer makes an interesting argument in favor of a departure in American foreign policy which to the majority of American citizens will seem obnoxious and dangerous. He proposes an intimate association in international politics between Great Britain and the United States. Whatever weight the proposal has is derived from one major consideration. The American nation any more than the nations of Europe cannot escape its share of a general responsibility for the peace of the world; and the only way in which such a responsibility can be sufficiently redeemed is by participation by the United States in European international councils. Mr. Beer proposes a definite association between this country and the European Power with whom we already have a fair understanding, whose interests coincide on the whole with our own, and whose domestic organization and foreign policy might help to make such association serve the pacification of the world. Many results of the war remain dubious, but if it has demonstrated anything it has demonstrated the mutual dependence between the United States and the Power which controls the seas.

Although the proposal may look revolutionary and dangerous to American public opinion, it is in truth less revolutionary than it looks, and probably not as dangerous as our present ambiguous isolation. The American people have never believed in complete national isolation as an agency of peace. They have recognized an obligation to make their foreign policy contribute if not to the peace of the world, at least to that of the western hemisphere. What else has been the real object of the Monroe Doctrine? Behind the blurred meaning of the phrase has always intruded the remote but clearly recognizable ideal of a group of nations inhabiting the two Americas which would be free from ancient antipathies, from mutual suspicions, from external aggression, and from the exploitation of an autocratic ruling class. The government of the United States has never made any

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serious attempt to bring into existence this benevolent American international system, but the vision of it has been unmistakably present; and if ever the Doctrine is really challenged by a European or Asiatic power, it must obviously develop in one of two directions. Either the United States must assume a protectorate over the western hemisphere based upon unquestionable military and naval preponderance, or a Pan-American international system devoted to preserving peace in the western hemisphere must be organized. The isolation which we cherished and which we have been willing to fight for was the isolation of the Americas from Europe, not the isolation of the United States from the world.

What Americans need most to understand is that if they seriously wish to redeem the obligation implicit in the Monroe Doctrine they must extend its scope. If they seriously intend to guard against the invasion of the Americas by European suspicions, antipathies and international aggression, they must themselves carry the fight against these evils into Europe. A secure American international system, no matter how benevolent, cannot remain exclusively American. Its security cannot depend ultimately upon its ability to defend itself against European and Asiatic aggression, because such security would mean an indefinite competition in armaments with foreign Powers. We should merely be organizing insecurity at a tremendous cost, adopting militarism for the sake of protecting ourselves against it. Security in the United States and in America must be primarily a reflection of security in Europe. The whole of America cannot construct a benevolent international organization independent of Europe, any more than one part of it can. The attempted isolation of two continents would be even more disastrously fallacious than the attempted isolation of a single nation.

There should be added the obvious consideration that several European countries already possess dependencies or self-governing dominions in the American hemisphere. These provinces could not be left out of a Pan-American system, but could not be included in it without involving the mother-country. The difficulty is so obvious that American publicists have recently proposed an heroic remedy. They have been insisting that the European nations should be politely but firmly requested to retire from the American continent. It has not been proposed as yet to expel them in case they refuse, but surely their forcible expulsion would be the logical result of an American system whose security depended upon isolation from Europe. As long as they continued to recognize a European allegiance their European political ties would imply obligations incompatible with their geographical Americanism. Take, for instance, the case of Canada during the present war. Canadian soldiers have been sent to France and Belgium in order to kill Germans. Germany would consequently have every military justification in attacking Canada if only her army could land on Canadian soil. Yet if she did attack Canada, American security in so far as it depended on isolation would be fatally compromised, and the army of the United States, whatever it amounted to, would have to be sent to Canadian assistance. Canadians are allowed to kill Germans in Europe, but the Germans cannot be allowed to carry the war into their enemy's countries. This is merely a flagrant instance of the difficulties and absurdities which result from the attempt to secure peace in America without any reference to the forces which are making both for peace and war in Europe.

Any secure Pan-American system must rest upon effective sympathy and support in Europe. If the United States really wishes to secure the Americas against European aggression it must arrange an understanding with the European Power whose assistance would be most serviceable. That Power is plainly the mistress of the seas. An arrangement with Germany, even if in other respects possible or desirable, would involve the enmity of Great Britain and the necessity of building a navy large enough to contest with her the control of the seas. An arrangement with Great Britain would enable the United States to keep its armament within moderate limits, while at the same time providing the utmost possible security for its Pan-American system. In point of fact the Monroe Doctrine has almost from the beginning depended on British good-will, and no matter what form it assumes in the future, it cannot escape such dependence. It cannot be protected against the dominant sea power except by challenging British maritime supremacy. It cannot effectively be contested except with the consent of the British commonwealth. Thus an alliance with Great Britain would merely formally recognize a situation which has existed for some time and has been emphasized by the circumstances of the war. It would constitute in effect an offer of the support of American resources to Great Britain at a time when British resources were depleted, and in return for a larger measure of national security and a persuasive promise of future international pacification.

The NEW REPUBLIC does not endorse a British alliance as an immediately practicable measure of American foreign policy. Even if public opinion were disposed to reach an agreement with England instead of being reluctant or indifferent, the obstacles to be surmounted before a definite treaty could be contrived would be numerous and stubborn. The United States could not enter into an

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alliance with Great Britain in case Great Britain and her existing Allies at the end of the war continued in combination expressly for the purpose of securing the fruits of a victory over Germany. It could not enter into an alliance with Great Britain until its existing controversy with that country in respect to the control of maritime commerce during war had been adjusted, and a charter of commercial rights satisfactory in some measure to pacific trading nations framed, signed and sealed. Finally, a definition of the scope of the arrangement and the limitation of the liabilities incurred by both parties under it, would involve at the present time enormous and perhaps insuperable difficulties.

But if a formal alliance is not possible in the near future, an increasing measure of mutual understanding is. Such an understanding can gradually be reached provided an enlightened public opinion in the United States seeks to bring it about, and as a means of bringing it about deliberately plans to adjust existing conflicts of policy, to establish routes of agreement, and to clear up the ambiguities of the existing relationship. The initiative should be taken by the agencies of American opinion, not because we would gain more from an understanding than Great Britain would, but because the obstacles to an understanding in this country are more serious than the obstacles in Great Britain. The greatest obstacle is the American tradition of national isolation—the sense that by committing ourselves to European responsibilities we should be surrendering something essential and noble in our heritage of democracy. This tradition is the enemy which must be exposed and exterminated, for unless it is exterminated we shall have misinterpreted the chief lesson of the war and permitted the nation to continue a policy of suicidal exclusiveness. As yet we seem to have learned nothing. The disheartening aspect of the current agitation for military preparedness is that it is animated not by a clear conviction of the international obligations and opportunities of the country, but by a kind of blind suspicion and panic. The proclaimed object of the armament is to defend our national isolation, not to realize a positive policy which will enable us to promote both our own security and the peace of the world. There can be no permanent security unless the pacific nations are welded into an organization sufficiently tough, alert, clear-headed and well-equipped to make their joint power count decisively in the balance against an aggressive disturber of the peace. An increasing understanding between Great Britain and the United States would constitute a necessary condition of any League of Peace, and if it could develop into an alliance it might become by virtue of unassailable maritime supremacy the substance and chief support of such a League.

"Plumb Insane"

IF reports are true, Mr. Thomas Shevlin has made a memorable utterance: "Against Princeton you must all go insane, plumb insane—but keep your heads." The result is known to all the world, and how all the world feels about it can be seen from an account written for the New York *Evening Post*: "...through utter willingness to give the final measure of physical sacrifice, those men of Yale lifted from the muck a bedraggled, bedaubed blue banner, holding it on high so that it floated and snapped proudly once more, glorified by the light of victory." Treitschke would hardly have done better than this: "If there was a Yale graduate who did not feel the impulse to stand in his place and uncover silently..."

That it is a splendid thing to go insane, to keep your head, and to uncover silently is not to be denied. The glory of football is that it permits such things. A struggle in which a man can be an absolute partisan is a comfort indeed. No Yale man need question that Yale ought to win. Harvard men and Princeton men can be as certain. They can be loyal without a quaver of conscience, they can desire victory without thinking of consequences. Wherever they happen to belong, there they can put their faith. And even those hyphenates who go from Yale to the Harvard Law School may be for Yale and no questions asked.

If only life were like football, what a splendid education young America would be receiving. It would be learning that loyalty is greater than discrimination, that the crowd you are in is the best crowd of all. A Yale freshman who wanted to see Harvard win because Harvard contributes to human culture would be an ass. He would be treated by his classmates as Englishmen are now treated who admire German professors. For the point you are trained to in intercollegiate athletics is that there are only two sides to a question, and that the side you are against has nothing to recommend it.

There have been highbrow eulogies of football. It is, we are told, a harmless outlet for pugnacity; it introduces a dionysian element into our drab lives; it purges through pity and fear; it is to America what the Saturnalia was to the ancients. Perhaps. Yet one difference must be noted. The Greeks never supposed that the passions they put into their festivals were the passions that ought to dominate human life. In the spiritual democracy which they preached they gave representations to all the elements of man. With us this is not the case. We like to regard college spirit as a model. We expect a man to feel towards his country, his city, his corporation, his political party, about as

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the freshman feels towards his team. We like to cultivate the habit of being partisan, and the habit attunes itself to any notions. We fail to say: "Go insane about Yale, but not about American concessions in Mexico. Go insane about DeWitt Clinton High School, but discriminate about Germany."

It is perhaps a rule of spiritual hygiene that a man who doesn't go insane about something is likely to go insane about everything. And Yale is as good an object to go insane about as almost anything we can think of at the moment. But the trouble with insanity as an ideal of education is that it doesn't exactly prepare for the sort of world we live in. That world requires the faculty of doubting, of making distinctions, of caring enormously without sinking into credulity. Just what colleges are doing to cultivate these faculties it is sometimes a little hard to see. There are professors awake to the problem who would like to abolish football, because in the competition for attention it wins so easily. That is the stupid easy remedy. After all, football puts the professor on his mettle by showing him how far he is from enlisting human passion in the cause of science; and the grim joke which gives football coaches a bigger salary than teachers is a fairly good indication of what education has still to accomplish. There have been teachers whose memory was brighter than the brightest victory.

Constitution-Making

AN extraordinary discrepancy exists between the legitimate purposes of constitution-making and the means by which we actually make our state constitutions. With popular sovereignty the first postulate of our political system, the primary purpose of our constitution-makers ought to be to construct effective machinery for the execution of the popular will. Yet throughout our history we have packed our conventions with men who distrust the people, and whom the people distrust. Our constitution-makers ought further to provide us with a system of legal principles of wider acceptability and superior validity than ordinary legislation requires. They should therefore display a more scrupulous regard for the opinions of minorities than do the regular organs of legislation. But nowhere do we make any adequate provision for minority representation in constitutional conventions. The political parties, which may have an appropriate place in carrying on the government under the constitution, arrogate to themselves the very function of constitution-making. It has even come to seem natural that a constitutional convention is controlled by Republicans or by Democrats. Hence we are not shocked when a mass of partisan projects is thrust into the body of what ought to be our fundamental law, acceptable to everyone. The struggle of classes, it will be agreed, ought to be conducted under the constitution, not in it. But in practice the several classes strive to dominate the convention and write the fundamental law in their own interest. Not without certain concessions to patriotism, to be sure. The late New York State convention was perhaps as good as an example as we have ever had of a partisan body representing primarily the interests of a single class—the property owners of the state—yet it produced a constitutional project which was freer from partisan and class vices than most American state constitutions. Perhaps the labor forces will control the next convention, and we shall have an opportunity of learning how far the working class is capable of subordinating its own interests to the general good.

Our art of constitution-making is based on false principles. It should not be the aim of any party or class to control the process of making a fundamental law for all. Effort should be made instead to get every definite, self-conscious interest to participate in constitution-making. It is natural for the country to oppose the city, but this opposition ought to work itself out in the legislature, where the ill-considered action of one session may be revoked in the next. The constitution ought to contain only provisions under which both city and country are content to live. Capital and labor have many opposing interests, and struggle between them is inevitable. But the constitutional convention is no proper arena for this struggle. An honest fundamental law would leave open for legislative determination such matters as are in dispute between the economic classes.

The people of New York State are not satisfied with their existing constitution. It is antiquated and obstructionist, a source of legislative ineffectiveness, of social waste. The substitute provided by the late convention was an improvement on the old constitution, but not enough of an improvement to command strong support from any quarter. And there is not the slightest reason for supposing that the next convention will be more successful. We shall continue to live under a constitution adapted, possibly, to the needs of half a century ago, while growing social forces, finding themselves thwarted in their natural development by rigid constitutional barriers, will assume an increasingly revolutionary character. Thus political ineffectiveness and social disorder are part of the price for our failure to work out a rational method of constitution-making.

Yet the task is by no means insuperable. We have no official means of giving minorities adequate representation in conventions, no official means of securing representation of fundamental interests in

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place of political parties; very well, let us fall back upon extra-official initiative. We may recall that the most successful written constitution in the world, that of the United States, originated in an extra-official initiative. There is surely enough public spirit in New York to make possible the organization of an unofficial convention to which every important interest would be eager to send qualified representatives. Such a convention would be at pains to secure delegates from labor unions, manufacturers' associations, chambers of commerce, farmers' organizations—in short, from every interest in the state that has attained to self-consciousness and some form of organization. With such a personnel working systematically toward the ideal of a constitution that would command the assent of all constitutents, there would be a fair chance of outlining a constitution really worthy of the name of fundamental law, which might later be submitted for elaboration and ratification to a convention officially constituted.

In this unofficial convention there would be no place for partisan tactics and steam-roller methods. Decisions would be reached through discussion and compromise, and subjects upon which compromise is impossible would be excluded from the final project of the convention. It follows that the projected constitution would be a document of brevity and simplicity, like the original Federal Constitution. It would not attempt to take contentious subjects out of the hands of the legislature, nor would it waste space upon petty measures—such, for example, as the proper disposal of dead wood from the Adirondack forests. What the delegates would insist upon would be a document that could be successfully defended before their constitutents. A constitution so long and involved that only legal experts could catch its drifts would not answer this purpose. Our Federal Constitution can be discussed intelligently by the farmer and the factory hand; it would never have been adopted if its provisions had been so numerous and so murky as those making up the constitution defeated in New York State.

The place of the state in our political system has gained in importance in recent decades. Economic progress has thrown forward a vast array of legislative problems which under our system must be left to the disposal of the states themselves. It is of the utmost importance that state governments be transformed into legislative and administrative organs of the greatest efficiency. This transformation is impracticable under our cumbersome state constitutions. And constitutional reform is possible only if we succeed in breaking away from our archaic methods of constitution-making, and in devising methods which shall give due weight to contemporary social and political realities.

A Leader of Humanity

THE death of Booker T. Washington closes a career in many respects the most remarkable in his generation. No man in our time has attained a greatness under heavier handicaps. He was the son of a slave mother and of a white father of whom nothing is known beyond what can be inferred from his unacknowledged parenthood. Politically emancipated as a child, he still had resting upon him the colossal burdens of a race despised and oppressed, of an illiterate tradition, of extreme poverty. Yet by his fortieth year he had attained national distinction, and at the time of his death he was respected and admired not only throughout his own country, but wherever men are sincerely attempting to elevate the common man and correct the wrongs of the ages. We used to describe Booker T. Washington, somewhat patronizingly, as a leader of the negro race. So he was indeed, and one of the best racial leaders in history. He displayed a nearly unique capacity for exciting in his people a healthy pride of race without employing the means of invidious disparagement of other races. He elevated the American negroes in their own eyes and in the eyes of the whites—a vastly significant achievement. But what is still more significant, he strengthened the bonds of affection subsisting between the two races.

Booker T. Washington's work as an educator has scarcely a parallel even in this country of extraordinary educational organizers. Thirty-five years ago all there was of Tuskegee was a shanty housing some thirty raw negro pupils and a single teacher with potentialities recognized only by himself. It was a bad time for negro education. The old abolitionist doctrine of racial equality had about run its course. The North was beginning to yield to the Southerner's doubts as to the expediency of trying to educate the colored race. There was apparently no satisfactory place in the scheme of the world for the educated negro. Since it was to be the destiny of the race to remain servile and dependent, why awaken aspirations that could never be realized, that could only lead to unrest and disorder? What the negro really needed, so it was asserted, was a docile and contented existence under the benevolent control of the whites. It was the formidable obstacle of this attitude that Booker T. Washington's little school at Tuskegee had to overcome. And it has been overcome entirely. Negro education as organized in Tuskegee has few detractors. The thousands of graduates of the Institute have no difficulty in finding their place in the world. To-day they are scattered throughout the South, and they are pushing themselves forward in farming, handicrafts and business, or are engaged

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in teaching others of their race how to advance. The reports of the Negro Business Men's League —an association founded by Booker T. Washington—indicate an astonishing progress of the race toward economic independence.

There are, it is true, representatives of the older school of negro leadership who have viewed askance the tendencies implicit in Booker T. Washington's work. It is natural that a negro of intelligence and refinement should chafe under the political and social disabilities that have been imposed upon his race, and should regard their removal as the one thing in life worth fighting for. Booker T. Washington's counsel to hold the political and social claims of the negro in abeyance and concentrate effort upon his economic advancement, has appeared to negro leaders of the old school as an abject surrender to the racial arrogance of the whites. And the universal approval, on the part of the whites, of Booker T. Washington's methods and aims has enhanced the suspicion and bitterness of the intransigeants. Why did the whites approve of the industrial education of the negro? Because a negro trained industrially makes a better hand. Why did they approve of the efforts to cultivate thrift in the negroes and the ambition for land-ownership? Because the thrifty, land-hungry negro raises the price of land and makes a good customer for the white business man. Booker T. Washington was approved by the whites, it has often been insinuated, because he played into the hands of the whites. Not merely that he made the negro more useful to the whites; what was more ominous, he diverted the energies of the negroes and of their white friends from the struggle for political and social equality.

Such a view of Booker T. Washington and his work has merely a subjective validity. It can be explained; it arises naturally out of the conditions in which its exponents find themselves. But no one who has studied the history of oppressed races can question the correctness of Booker T. Washington's tactics or the soundness of his philosophy. For he had a philosophy, coherent enough even if its exposition is scattered through his hastily composed and voluminous writings. In this philosophy there is no postulate of the racial inferiority of the negro. In America the negro is "the man farthest down," in a position strictly analogous to that of the Slovenes in Hungary or the Ukrainians in Galicia or South Russia. All the degrading characteristics imputed to the negro by the ruling whites are imputed to the Slovenes and Ukrainians by the ruling Magyars, Poles and Russians. As in our own South the whites own most of the land, monopolize the civil service and the professions, so in those parts of Europe where an oppressed race is held under by its historical conquerors, land ownership, the civil service and the professions are the domain of the ruling race. For hundreds of years the oppressed races of Europe have struggled to raise themselves through political agitation and social striving—in vain. These are not solvents sufficiently powerful to relax the cohesion of the ruling caste. But where the Slovene or Ukrainian has succeeded in gaining economic power the weight of oppression begins to lift. If the goal of an oppressed race is political equality, economic progress is usually the only feasible road to its attainment.

The conflict between races established on the same soil is an insuperable barrier to the progress of democracy. A ruling race will never relax its grip upon the political power in response to the moral and intellectual striving of a subject race. But a ruling race will countenance attempts on the part of the oppressed to increase their economic efficiency, partly because the members of the ruling race hope to profit thereby and partly because a ruling race affects to despise the purely economic field and whatever goes on in it. The subject race can elevate itself, through industry and thrift, without encountering any serious opposition. To develop these qualities by education, precept, organized propaganda, is the first duty of the leader of a race which finds itself in a condition of political subjection. Booker T. Washington saw more clearly than any other American the fundamental conditions upon which the progress of his race must depend, and he created an effective technique accordingly. Thereby he made himself not only the foremost leader of his own race, but also gave a fruitful example to other oppressed races of whatever color; and since the problem of the oppressed races and classes is universal, Booker T. Washington is entitled to rank as a leader of humanity.

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America's Part Among Nations

THE present war has plainly demonstrated that self-regarding nationalism is destructive of the civilization of a world that has been made as it were a unit by the mechanical inventions of the past hundred years. Though all states are more or less infected with this controlling egotism, it is not necessarily an inherent attribute of nationalism. It is even now to a limited extent, and in the future it probably will be in an increasing measure, modified by ideals of mutual service for the benefit of mankind as a whole. At one pole in the world of to-day is the German super-state which, goaded on by the aggressive tenets of neo-mercantilism and neo-odinism and imbued with the idea of a mission to reorganize a decadent world, shows almost no consideration for the rights of others. At the opposite pole is England, whose nationalism is not only controlled by powerful moral inhibitions, but has been tempered by two generations of free trade and by centuries of intimate contact with different races in all corners of the globe. But in spite of the fact that England consistently for years strove to avert the impending world-war, she cannot escape some degree of negative responsibility for it, primarily because she refused to assume the burden of adequate military preparedness and thus indirectly encouraged Germany's plan to dominate Europe. The responsibility is radically different in kind and degree from that of Germany and must be shared by other nations, some belligerent and some still neutral, all of whom have over-emphasized their national rights and have either minimized or ignored the complementary obligations to the still unorganized world-community of states.

It follows inevitably from this that we of the United States are, in the same sense as England and possibly even to a greater degree, responsible for the existing chaos. By our policy of self-centred aloofness from the affairs of Europe, we have deliberately ignored the obligations that every state owes to mankind. Such a policy was probably expedient in the days of our weakness, but the United States steadfastly adhered to it even after it had become one of the great Powers and thus forfeited the influence it could and should have exerted upon the course of world history. In that the United States deliberately refused to become involved in any European matters, we must bear some measure of responsibility for the existing world-war.

This will be conclusively apparent if we examine the course of recent international history and the fundamental aim of German world politics. The broad purpose is to oust the English-speaking peoples from the prominent position they are occupying in all the continents, thanks to the activities of their adventurous ancestors throughout the past three centuries. According to Rohrbach, Germany must become "co-mistress of the culture of the world, or it will not exist at all." The enemy is not only the British Empire, but the United States as well, for the cultural unity of all English-speaking peoples is fully recognized. What English-speaking pioneers have accomplished bit by bit since the days of Elizabeth, the German state with its military prowess planned to duplicate in a few years.

These aims first manifested themselves in overt action during the South African difficulties and during the Spanish-American War. The reaction of the English-speaking peoples was important. In the British Empire set in an ever-swelling movement for greater cohesion which has not yet reached its term. From this time also dates a marked increase of friendship between England and the United States, which is largely traceable to the same source. At considerable intervals, isolated voices were raised here and there in America urging diplomatic co-operation, an alliance, and even a loose form of political union with the British Empire. But these met with no broad popular response, primarily because the people were engrossed in their own diverse affairs and had only the most superficial knowledge of international politics. In England, naturally, there was a keener realization of the imminence of the German peril; and many Englishmen turned to what might have been, and began to regard the political schism in the English-speaking race effected by the American Revolution as the great tragedy of modern history, in that it weakened the forces that stood preëminently for political freedom. But with their usual common-sense, they recognized that public opinion in America was not ripe for such a reversal of policy as an Anglo-American alliance implied. Had the United States, however, contracted such ties with the British Empire, Germany's ambitious plans would probably never have emerged from the academic phase, for the land of *Realpolitik* would have realized their futility in the face of the united opposition of the English-speaking peoples. Not only would the present European agony have been prevented, but the entire course of world history during the past decade would have been far more conformable to our ideals and interests.

Since the opening of the century British foreign policy has been completely dominated by the German menace. Every effort, even to the extent of sacrificing important British interests and jettisoning tra-

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ditional policies, was made to avert a European war. This is the keynote to recent international history and explains many seemingly unrelated events in Africa, China, Persia, Morocco, Turkey, and the Balkan states. During these vicissitudes not a few things were done which were repugnant to the American conscience. But our government, pursuing its traditional course, was silent, except in regard to China; and the vehement complaints of a few individual Americans totally overlooked the fact that their country might have had some duty in the premises. In addition, definite American interests were prejudiced. In the precariously unstable international situation the policy of the open door in China could not be maintained by England alone, and the knowledge that we would under no circumstances use more than moral suasion rendered our advocacy of it ineffective.

At present Europe is in the throes of an internecine war in which the future of civilization is at stake. Upon the outcome depend not only the liberties of Europe and of the world, but also the future of democracy. For in a world so unorganized politically that its peace is at the mercy of one Power, the crucial test of any form of political organization cannot be the more or less satisfactory nature of its inner life, but must perforce be its ability to defend itself and to survive in a struggle imposed by others. Were European democracy to fail in this crisis, its fate would be sealed, and America would become the last bulwark of popular government. For this fundamental reason there is an almost literal truth in the statement that the Allies are fighting America's battles.

The American people have not failed to perceive —somewhat vaguely, it is true—that the gravest issues are at stake, but they have only a faint realization of the extent to which their future is dependent upon the defeat of German ambitions. Hence, while predominantly pro-Ally in sentiment, the United States does not recognize that it has any obligations to intervene, and the neutrality maintained by Washington is an accurate expression of the will of the people. About this neutrality there are current curious misconceptions. Neutrality is essentially passive and in itself has no moral value. It is merely a right sanctioned by international usage, but it is in no sense a moral duty. Obviously a great Power which, in a world-war that is determining the future course of civilization and consequently its own destiny as well, deliberately remains passive and abstains from aiding what it considers to be the cause of civilization is by this very fact placed upon the moral defensive. Its neutrality, instead of being *a priori* meritorious, requires justification if it is to escape condemnation.

What has been neglected in the past cannot be altered, nor can a nation trained for generations to look within change its self-centred attitude in a day. But the past and present may serve as warnings for the future. The war has set Americans furiously to thinking about problems that formerly seemed academically remote. A daily increasing number have reached the conclusion that we must in the future assume our share of the burden of maintaining the public right of the world. While it is generally assumed that we are destined, whether we like it or not, to be drawn more and more into the international field, there has been but little discussion of the part we are to play.

Whatever the exact outcome of the war may be, it seems certain that the present alignment of the nations will be continued for some time after its close; and that, if America is to have an effective voice and her interests are to be adequately protected, she must join one or the other diplomatic group. Isolated she would be defenseless, for it would be sheer folly to overlook the fact that the part played by a neutral in an internecine struggle cannot arouse friendly feeling among the belligerents. According to a poem of the last world-war, "the Devil alone is neutral." If the United States should remain isolated after the war, the consequences would certainly be serious and possibly disastrous. German ambitions in South America have been dormant only because the British fleet was an insuperable barrier. If that were forced or voluntarily raised, the Monroe Doctrine's efficacy would be put to the real test. Similar dangers threaten our economic interests in the Far East unless we emerge from our isolation and join hands with other nations. But more than mere moral cooperation is necessary if in the future war is to be avoided.

It is obvious that the only Powers with whom our political traditions and our material interests would permit active coöperation are the present Allies of the Quadruple Entente, and among these England would naturally be the one to whom our common civilization would draw us most closely. An alliance of the United States with the British Empire in unequivocal terms, made in the open light of day, would effectively secure the future peace of the world and its development along democratic lines. In both branches of the politically separated but culturally united English-speaking race, an unfettered public opinion, basing its judgments upon the dictates of personal morality, as a rule obliges the government in its conduct of foreign affairs to conform to standards that are not generally recognized elsewhere. Of all the great Powers, these two are the only ones not infected with dreams of military glory or with ambitions of territorial aggrandizement. With them alone is peace the genuine goal

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of policy. As a result, the general policy of the United States and that of the British Empire follow parallel lines. The fundamental aim of both states is security, but security does not merely mean safety from invasion. In these days of rapid communication and of ever-closer economic interdependence of the world, it implies in addition the protection of a nation's economic and political interests in other countries. As these British and American interests depend primarily upon the maintenance of the open door and the prevention of other nations from gaining exclusive privileges, they can best be protected by joint efforts.

But apart both from the general obligation of every state to see that order and justice obtain in the world, and also from the demands of national self-interest, there is one very potent argument for an Anglo-American alliance. Hitherto, not as the result of any virtues innate in them, but rather by the fortunate accident of position, the English-speaking peoples have been able to escape the burdens and dangers of large military establishments. Apparently if they do not pool their defensive resources neither branch will be thus fortunate in the future. Although militarism differs radically from preparedness, it is a menace inherent therein. Except to a very minor degree none of the insidious dangers of militarism are to be feared from a strong navy. A navy is essentially a defensive weapon and its political influence must always be relatively negligible.

It is almost axiomatic that the military and naval forces of any state should be commensurate not only with its policies but also with its alliances and less formal diplomatic arrangements. Obviously, if the United States remains free from what are popularly known as foreign entanglements, the extent of its military preparedness must be far greater than if it were allied with the British Empire.

England is in a similar case. Only if such an alliance were consummated could the defensive preparations of both countries remain of such proportions that their political institutions would not be endangered. With the aid of only comparatively small standing armies, capable of quick expansion from a manhood trained to arms somewhat on the Swiss model, their joint fleets would be able not only to protect them but to secure the general peace of the world. Local wars might still occur, but as in the case of the existing conflict, the causes of possible future world-wars will lie in conditions outside of Europe.

Such an alliance, made for no aggressive purpose and seeking merely to preserve peace, order and justice in the world, would naturally attract to it the nations of like mind, and might be the foundation stone of that federation of the world which alone can reconcile "the freedom of individuals and of individual states with the accomplishment of a common aim for mankind as a whole."

GEORGE LOUIS BEER.

Advice to China

THE Japanese Chargé d'Affaires at Peking has suggested to the Chinese Foreign Office that it would be unwise at the present time for China to change her form of government. It is apparently feared that the attempt to establish a monarchy with Yuan Shih Kai at its head may provoke disturbances which Japan could not regard with indifference, and which might tend to disturb the "peace of the Far East." London and Petrograd, reluctantly or otherwise, have endorsed this view; France did not join with her allies, nor did the United States venture to express an opinion. The Chinese Foreign Office promptly replied that the question was one of domestic policy regarding which the Chinese nation must make its own decision. This statement has apparently been satisfactory to Great Britain and Russia, but Japan now desires to know the meaning of China's rejoinder. So much for the cable setting for this latest development in the Far Eastern drama.

Notwithstanding enthusiastic editorials in the American and British press and the declarations of a great many honest but over-enthusiastic gentlemen, China has not been, is not now, and cannot be for many years to come in the accepted sense a republic. The government of China, like the rose, if called by any one of half a dozen names would smell as sweet. The Manchus passed into oblivion; there was a provisional presidency; a constitution was adopted; a national assembly was elected and was abolished, and a state council substituted in its stead. But through all these changes, from the 13th of November, 1912, in the early days of the revolution when Yuan Shih Kai returned to Peking, until the present time, the actual power has remained with him and the group of men who enjoy his confidence. It seems inconceivable that a single personality should so completely dominate a government that is responsible for between three and four hundred millions of peo-

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ple, yet such is the fact, and the firm establishment of this man's power affords the most hopeful prospect for China's future as a nation.

The government of China has never been representative, but it has always been in a sense democratic. Through the thousands of years of China's history the people have never elected their rulers, but have from time to time exercised the recall. They have allowed their rulers to go so far but no further. Dynasties have come and gone—governing by compromise and adjustment, taxing and growing fat, until their indolence and corruption has afforded an opportunity for another group to follow the same precedents, and to levy such imposts as the people considered to be reasonable as the inevitable price of officialdom. Through many changes China has changed little. The people have shrugged their shoulders and gone on as before. Viceroys and governors, intendants and prefects, have been appointed from Peking. But the authority of the central government has been dependent upon an ability to conciliate rival provincial factions, guilds and societies, and to play one against the other. More than that, it has rested ultimately upon the indifference of the mass of the people, who worried little about the government so long as the officials didn't attempt to interfere with their daily routine.

Contact with the world imposed upon the Chinese government a responsibility theretofore unknown, and since the middle of the last century China's chief troubles have arisen from an endeavor to meet these new conditions. The new wine finally burst the old bottle, and Yuan Shih Kai is endeavoring to construct a serviceable substitute. China is just beginning to realize that national organization is essential to national existence. The attempt of Sun Yat Sen and his visionaries to engraft what we know as a republican form of government on China's as yet unaltered institutions, was foredoomed to failure. But the Manchus having been driven from their throne and a so-called republic established, it was deemed wise to let young blood have its fling. This element, save for a few notable exceptions, preached patriotism when out of office, and practised peculation when once they had obtained it. Demonstration proved that the new system would not work. Yuan and the men about him, realizing that the world was in a ferment, felt that their country's safety could be assured only by the creation of a strong centralized power. Yuan's death was always a possibility, and the question of succession might have thrown the country into a turmoil. By adopting a monarchical form of government this danger would in a measure be forestalled. It may be true that Yuan's emissaries have been responsible for the popular petitions urging the change. His repeated refusals to accept the royal title may have been similar to those of the late lamented Julius Caesar. But no matter what intrigues have been necessary, no matter what the character of the machinery which has been utilized, the policy followed has been neither worse nor better than that which we know in other countries under different names, and the purpose which it has sought to accomplish has been good.

Japan, since she embarked upon her present imperial policy, has consistently endeavored to prevent the growth of a strong China. Japanese intrigue was largely responsible for the dismissal of Yuan Shih Kai following the death of the Emperor Kwang Hü and the great Empress Dowager in 1908. Japan assisted the revolution of 1912, and endeavored to prevent Yuan Shih Kai, who was charged with safeguarding the tottering Manchu throne, from reaching any settlement with the southern rebels. The revolution of 1913 and the abortive uprising of the following year were directed from Japan. The Japanese government may not have been directly responsible, but it was certainly not unaware of the activities of the so-called "Chinese patriots," nor unsympathetic to their cause.

In the diplomatic controversy provoked by the demands which Japan presented early this year, Yuan's ascendency was threatened. If he yielded he would have been discredited with his own people, and Japan's predominant position in China would have been unquestioned. If he refused to yield, Japan might have had an opportunity, and was in fact prepared, to gain by conquest that which she could not obtain by negotiation. By a happy combination of circumstances China was enabled, somewhat shopworn, to muddle through. Yuan and his advisers determined to strengthen their hold upon the country and to mobilize their resources in order to be better prepared for the next struggle between Tokyo and Peking. This has been precipitated by Japan's most recent diplomatic representation.

Why did the British and Russian representatives join with the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires? Only speculation is possible, but it is interesting to note that almost simultaneously with the *démarche* at Peking it was announced that Japan had entered into an agreement with the Allies not to negotiate a separate peace. In the light of recent history it seems not unreasonable to suppose that both Great Britain and Russia desired, so to speak, to have a finger in the pie. Neither power could welcome unquestioned Japanese supremacy at Peking. Neither, in view of the European situation, could take issue with Japan at the present time. It would seem probable, therefore, that in joining with Japan they were actuated by a desire to protect

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China, and to soften Japanese representations by giving them an international character, rather than by a wish to endorse and emphasize the views therein expressed.

The situation should develop before the end of the year. It is not impossible that numerous bodies of patriots in the south of China will take arms as a protest against the change from a republic to a monarchy. It is safe to suggest that in such a case the inspiration may come from Tokyo. Whether disorders will result which will make Japan feel it necessary for her to intervene in order to protect foreign lives and property remains to be seen. Arson with a view to collecting the insurance is not unknown even in the Far East. Perhaps the fact that Great Britain and Russia might also be inclined to protect their nationals and to make any possible intervention international will prevent this eventuality. Qui vivra, verra.

SINOLOGUE.

The Hope of the Minimum Wage

MINIMUM wage laws are to all practical intents as yet untried in the United States. Even their validity remains doubtful, for the Supreme Court still holds undecided the test case argued nearly a year ago. In Australia, where analogous laws have been in operation for over ten years, it is different, and in the current number of the *Harvard Law Review* one may learn from Mr. Justice Higgins, President of the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, how the federal law has worked during the eight years that he has been the only official charged with its enforcement.

That court, which must not be confused with the intra-state wage-boards or industrial courts, has power to act only when the industry affected covers more than one state of Australia, but in such case it acts with the fullest latitude. Like our own commissions for the regulation of railways and other common carriers, the statute gives the Court power to fix a "fair and reasonable" wage which may thereafter be enforced by penalties. This is no less than to put the whole problem upon the Court, because the words "fair and reasonable" are no more than a rhetorical admonition that the positions of each party must be heard and regarded. Nor is there apparently any appeal, except when the Court has decided a case not provided for by the act. In other cases the Court calls together the parties for conciliation, and if they cannot themselves agree, proceeds to a compulsory settlement of their differences, without lawyers, without the rules of evidence, and with as much informality as seems to it convenient. All this, however, is not done summarily, nor without the delays unhappily inevitable to any honest inquiry into complicated facts. Nor do we learn that the Court may use evidence of which the parties are not informed, a limitation inherent in the fair settlement of any controversy.

In practice the Court has proceeded upon the assumption that no industry is legal which cannot and does not pay a "living wage"—this being a wholly relative phrase, to be determined from time to time according to the cost of those things which the workman must buy: rent, food, clothes, fuel and the like. But the Court goes beyond this and fixes the "fair and reasonable" value of skilled wages above what it would fix for a "living wage." It has even the power—seldom if ever exercised except to break down obvious attempts at destroying a union—of compelling the employer to give preference in employment to a union, thus recognizing the union as a legal means for the protection of the workmen. Such a doctrine contrasts strangely with the doctrine of our own Supreme Court, that a law designed to prevent employers from breaking down unions can have no rational public purpose.

The rule for fixing wages is not defined; obviously it cannot be. The award must be made after considering the relative strength of the two contending parties, and success must rest upon the Court's divination of what the resultant of forces would be. Such awards accomplish what they frankly are intended to accomplish, the avoidance of those economic struggles which are so wasteful to both parties. What a well-organized union and an intelligent body of employers might reach by collective bargaining, Australia reaches by a court, but the basis of settlement must in both cases be the same, viz, the probable result if each side fought to a finish. This perhaps is the only meaning that justice can have in the circumstances.

The "living wage" comes from a wholly independent theory. In this we find the state taking sides and refusing to allow the economic power of either side uncontrolled opportunity. The state will not allow industry to proceed at all if it cannot pay the workmen what it chooses to fix as a standard—an "arbitrary" standard, if one likes contentious adjectives. This phase is what may interest us especially.

A more formidable argument may be made against the plan than is often recognized by its adherents. The state forbids anyone to employ men at less than a prescribed wage, sometimes

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higher than is current in the industry. Unless those who are earning less can get work at the new wage they become dependents, so that their right to work for the old wage may seem to them a very genuine "freedom." The distress which drives them to take low-paid jobs is an external pressure, but, given the situation the "freedom of contract" gives them some help to withstand it; while the minimum wage takes that away and leaves nothing in its stead. Nor can we have any assurance that work at the new wage can be found for all who could get it at the old, even so much casual employment as might make up the sum of the old earnings.

The addition to wages must be made up either out of profits, out of the price of the article made, or out of an increased efficiency. There is no certainty that it will come out of profits, because the new wage is not to be applied alone to those employers whose profits are ample. Economists have long told us of the marginal producer, who, as it is, can just make both ends meet; his profits are nominal, yet his portion of the total production is as real as anyone's. Add to his burdens and you throw his men out of work. The first incidence of the theory would be to push out the weakest members of the trade. Nor is the situation necessarily met by raising the price, for that generally cuts down the amount which can be marketed; this is but another aspect of the first objection. As for the last suggestion, that higher wages bring their own increased efficiency, that depends largely upon the character of consumption, and in any case it operates slowly. Besides, it presupposes that those who were not making standard wages when the change came can keep their jobs, which we have seen to be only an assumption. It will not improve the workers' morale or efficiency to be awarded a standard wage when there are no jobs open.

Reasoning of this kind may not be positive, and we have come to be suspicious of it, yet it does uncover possibilities. Replying by the same kind of argument, we may retort that an increase of wages does not operate in any such automatic way as has been presupposed, and does not throw capital at once out of employment. Industry is not a reservoir which transmits at once a change of pressure; rather it is a compressible medium with immense room for the "take-up" of local pressures. We may reasonably believe that there will be a period within which the effects of better living may be made known in increased efficiency while the old jobs are open. Indeed it is in this possibility that the best hope of the undertaking lies, one that we must never forget while the chance remains open. It is a means of education, a step forward in the standard of living. Much will depend upon the way the increase is used, but it has been long recognized that a sudden rise in the standard of living may alone be enough to raise the class which gets it, since it reacts upon their own mental attitude towards life. Some relief from the oppression of physical privations, some security for a future, some provision against disease and unemployment, may so change the workman's approach to his daily routine as to make the increased wage a cheap industrial expedient, even when viewed in the most mechanical way. The result stands in trial, not in dialectic; but we must insist upon the reasonable expectation of those who view it hopefully, and we must seek to advance it, at least until it has been demonstrated to be false.

Yet even if this hope proved finally disappointing, much good will still come from the minimum wage. No doubt there will always be some who are incompetent under any system to produce enough to keep themselves and their families on that material level which is necessary for such citizenship as any state ought to fix. To insure to these the same standard of living is to harness them upon the competent; the alternative is to admit that they are dependents. It is with this in mind that Taussig speaks of the problem of the standard wage as part of the problem of the unemployable. Is the standard of living any advantage in dealing with this problem? The common way of meeting the difficulty has been to give such persons licenses to work at lower rates—obviously an expedient which may undermine the whole system unless guarded jealously. Let us suppose that it extends only to those who are so handicapped as to be beyond stimulation. These, then, take on a new status; they become citizens who cannot produce as much as the state holds necessary. By that very fact they would seem to fall out of the class which has full civil rights; they are among the dependents or deficients, who must either be carried by the rest, or radiate the social body with their influence.

The conclusion sounds harsh, but it is only because the existing facts are generally hidden. A standard of living does not create such persons, it only discloses them; they exist now, equally a burden upon the state, contributing to the indefinite and obscure mass of misery which loads and makes dubious the whole. To fix a standard which all must reach or be dubbed incompetent is one step towards facing the problems which the existing apathy conceals but does not modify. It will be an everlasting advantage if once we can clearly recognize that without some material standard citizenship is impossible, because then we shall, by implication at least, have asserted that some standard of full citizenship exists. What our society or any other will do in the face of that recognition is an immensely more complicated matter.

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Yet we can hardly suppose that, having set out to realize such a moral standard founded, as it is, on material wants, and perceiving its need for some guarantee against destruction by casual unemployment, any society will leave unregulated in its conduct, and especially in its numbers, that class which is permanently incapable of rising to those requirements.

Any such vision is many years in the future in such a country as our own. Purposes so thoroughgoing will be qualified by traditional scruples and obscured by sentimentalism masquerading as humane feeling. Yet the certain hope of standards of which this Australian experiment is one, even if we are disappointed in its ability to raise the capacity of the workmen, is that it will force upon our recognition the existence of those who are unable to become the kind of citizens we can tolerate. And we can be sure that all which throws into the highlight the facts of our social structure will help us to improve it, since the one ruthless condition of advance for any society is an increasing store of self-knowledge.

LEARNED HAND.

The Strike in South Wales

ON the afternoon of the third day of the strike I caught my first glimpse of a Welsh mining town. From the crest of the hills that bordered a narrow valley the long parallel rows of stone houses far below gleamed like an encampment of tents. The valley seemed paved with these monotonous gray shapes. At one end of the town chimney stacks, belching smoke, towered from the midst of ugly mining structures. The great wheels were motionless on their steel frames; there were no puffing jets of steam, no rattle of machinery to announce the ceaseless raising of coal from the pits. Except for the shrill cries of children and the noise of a distant waterfall there was silence.

The rough path plunged downward and suddenly became a slanting street lined with two solid rows of uniform colorless dwellings. At the foot of the street a middle-aged man stood surveying the chimney-pots that sprouted on a level with his feet from the roof of the house in the street below. He was a squat man with immense shoulders, an intelligent and healthy specimen of humanity. I wondered if he lived in one of those two-roomed houses and worked in the stifling dark half a mile underground.

"On strike?" I asked.

He whirled around glowering. "Aye, and what of it!" he said, and then as his eye caught my pack, "Walking, eh!" It was a talisman that I had never known to fail. In a few minutes I found myself talking with him freely in the crowded and smoky barroom of the nearest pub.

"'E wants to know why we're striking." My comrade's remark was apparently made to the barmaid, who was outwardly not unlike a New England schoolma'am. She looked at me severely over her steel-bowed spectacles. Her Welsh dialect was as thick as the atmosphere of the room.

"Well, there's some here that can tell him," she said. "Drink and talk, not work, that's them."

A violent discussion rose and raged through the smoke-laden air. The fact that I was an utter stranger, who might even be hostile to their interests, made not the slightest difference. Here and there a silent dour man stared bitterly at the dirty wall, as if war and strikes had little to do with the problems of existence. Many of the men spoke eloquently. Their unions had taught them the power of speech, schools had given them a measure of education, but greater than all of these, their dingy public-houses stood for free speech, a true parliament of the lower class.

From the end of the room a tall man with a cadaverous face and his arm set in a dirty sling broke in on a confused dispute as to whether or not the government had given the miners the full war bonus that had been promised. There was a suppressed violence in his tone and gestures that silenced everyone.

"My father died of starvation," he said, and I recognized his Lancashire dialect. "And there's many of you here as can say the same, and of your mothers, too, if you ever had any. And now, by God, you talk of bonuses! They're bribin' you, that's what they're doing with their dirty bonus. And when this war o' theirs is over, they'll have you by the throat and the life will be squeezed out of you unless you fight them all over again." He held up a great fist and clenched it.

A single dissentient voice arose. "But they've promised; Lloyd George——"

"Damn their promises!" broke in the man with the sling. "How do we know they'll keep them? How do we know if there will be any Parliament when the war is over, or that the whole dirty business isn't a trick?" He stopped abruptly, and all over the room the buzz of conversation and dispute broke out again.

"Who says we're better off for the war?" A little man who had drunk too many bitters for his health and who had been twice snubbed by the barmaid glared at me belligerently.

"The *Echo* says we're gettin' rich," said a cynical voice.

"Do you know what my buckskin breeches cost me, mister?" broke in another. "Or what they've done to things like bread and meat? They'd even

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raise the rents if they'd dared!" He pointed to the barmaid with his black thumb. "And lads, even she's raised the price of a drink on us. And we're gettin' rich, are we?" he sneered. "There's not a man here who can say that he's any better off than he was before the war. If he does, it's a lie; because he's worse." A man at my elbow, whose head had been nodding lower and lower over his empty glass, wiped his ragged moustache with the back of his blackened hand. "Ye're right!" he muttered. He staggered to the door, and as he passed, spat out at me. "And what the hell have you got to do with it anyhow?"

Through the blue smoke half of the eyes in the room were turned towards me. I stated my position. "I want to know why you're striking in the midst of war?" I asked. "You made them take the owner's profits away from them. Surely you can't expect to have things go on with you as if there was no war."

A confusion of voices answered me, and the man with the sling silenced them as he had done before.

"They give with one hand and take with the other," he shouted. "Do you think we can be any worse off than we were and keep from starving? You talk about taking away owner's profits. They're getting rich out of the war, I tell you. It's easy enough to make figures lie."

There was a clamor of approval. Men's names and collieries of which I had never heard were hurled at me. Who got rich out of the rise in the price of coal last winter? How many owners had their fingers in that pie, and would pile up their wealth in the same black way in the coming winter? What about the transportation companies, the steamship lines battening on the products of their labor? Above everything, they reiterated that figures could be made to lie; any common clerk could do it. What man in England, I wondered, had the power to still this flood of suspicion and distrust? They even suspected their own leaders. England was at war; what of their patriotism?

"They say in London," I added loudly, "that you are—that the miners don't care whether England wins or loses."

The gaunt man rose clumsily to his feet. He was angry. "Who's fighting this damned war if we're not? There's hardly a man around as hasn't got a brother or somebody at the front. Do you know how many the mines has sent out, or that we're working them a quarter with the boys instead of grown men? Me!" he struck his wounded arm painfully, "I'm going myself when this gets well, and I've got six kiddies. Bah, you make me sick!"

The stifling air in the room had grown unendurable. Outside the wind had died down and darkness was stealing over the dingy town. Along the endless streets, cut like steps in the side of the hill, I could see a monotonous perspective of smoking chimney-pots. The towering stack at the pithead still poured out its black cloud, so that a solid roof of smoke and mist had formed over the valley. Except for the glowing windows of the pubs and the light of a few shops, it was a world bereft of color.

The entire male population of the town might have been gathered in the streets. Crowds with impromptu orators collected at the corners and then merged into others or drifted into the saloons, which had attained the dignity of debating clubs. Always there was the same polite and gallant deference toward the girls and not much drunkenness.

The most striking phrases were repeated over and over, as if they had been graven on their minds. The war, the enemy's strategy, the chances of winning, were discussed with a temperateness and wisdom that would have abashed many a member of a London club. But invariably they came back to their own work and the fight they were making. Suspicion and bitterness tinged their words. The gaunt man with the injured arm, with the sunken eyes and set jaw, was a firebrand everywhere. He had a genius for cutting through the fog of petty worries and cares, the temporal affairs that fill men's minds because they are nearest. He laid bare the hate and distrust born and rooted in their hearts.

"We'll fight for them!" he cried, "and we'll win for them, but they can't make us their slaves." He insisted passionately that the least relaxation of their vigilance, the least submission to the smooth words of their masters, must be fatal. They must fight their double battle alone, lest their employers wring from the workers' bodies the money to pay for the war. Suspicion, discontent, hatred! Bitterness born of years of neglect and exploitation! Who could still this man's voice and the hundreds like it in every town and hamlet where workingmen were gathering throughout the British Isles?

Ten o'clock had come, the official closing hour. A red-haired maiden in a purple waist emerged from her sanctum behind a bar and shoved the reluctant miners, like so many complacent sheep, toward the door. We wandered toward the end of the town in dwindling groups. From the hillside that rose from the side of the street two figures fled past me in the dark. They were youthful lovers. Their forms blotted out for an instant the thin red glow that streamed from the mine half a mile across the valley. Silent in the darkness, heedless of war or death, the mine was waiting patiently for the human lives that it swallowed daily into its black depths.

HARRISON SMITH.

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Chicago: an Etching

A DULL murmur, an indefinable commingling of sounds is in the air. Heavy and continuous, it is carried on the wind to my window. Like an accelerating machine the rumble of the wakening city throbs louder: the voices of a million people, the grind of the elevated, the tread of countless feet. Beyond the grimy reach of flat roofs and blackened chimneys the towers of the "loop" rise against the gray of the morning sky like a feudal castle above the clutter of the town. On the south wind the smoke of the factories banks up against white steam-clouds from the office buildings in a thickening pall. To the left the leaden lake stretches off to the pale horizon. South along the shore a slanting gleam through the clouds brightens a low bank of clouds to polished steel; it is gone, and the smoke of the city blots out the distant curve of the lake.

North and south for thirty miles, and back ten miles to the prairie, the flat encrustation of the city presses against the lake. From the low bluffs on the north, where lie the pleasant suburbs, to the cinder-strewn, track-meshed yards of the steel mills, the continuous front of the city stops abruptly at the shore. In from the lake the narrow twisting artery of the river, cluttered with shipping, extends like a slot between wharves and warehouses. I can see the funnels of steamers rising oddly above the roofs, against the sheer sides of the office buildings beyond. The deep whistle of a lake steamer emerges above the growing clamor of the streets. After a wakeful sleep the city is beginning another day.

Across the river-bridges a steady tide of traffic surges into the loop. At Rush Street Bridge a double line of automobiles for two hours unending pours into the heart of the city. From the northern suburbs and the great stone houses of Lake Shore Drive it is carrying the wealth and power of industry; but from the south and west and northwest, in crowded elevated and surging street car, a greater tide is on the flood. Men and women, girls and boys—by the press of their numbered feet the giant treadmill is already beginning to turn.

Under the steel spans of the river-bridges a thick brown current flows back from the lake. Clean at the mouth of the river, it darkens as it passes on; a vast canal which bears in from the wide lake the great steel vessels, rich-laden with coal and grain. Above the wharves the high towers of grain elevators rear their corrugated sides; warehouses, windowless, massive, filled with rich gleaning from a thousand markets. Back and forth hurry the tugboats, whistles vibrating, funnels dipping back to clear the bridges.

High above Michigan Avenue Diana, poised against the gray sky, has swung pointing to the lake. A cold wind is coming from the water, clean and penetrating. Motors are passing down the wide boulevard in unceasing streams, minor eddies turning into the deep cuts of the cross-streets. Facing the high wall of office buildings the Art Institute, smoke-blackened and weather-stained, rises low and massive from the level park. On either side of it the waste-filled land, faintly green with uncertain sod and newly planted trees, stretches to the distant lake. A cloud of smoke and steam runs out and along a shallow cut parallel with the boulevard. Across the park, almost passing beneath the Institute, the tracks of a railway stretch south from the freight-yards by the river. Against the high buildings the noisy steam locomotives belch blackening smoke.

It is noon, and the rising wind has brushed back the smoke-laden clouds. Against the sky wisps of white steam bend like plumes from lofty roofs. Dearborn Street is choked with traffic. In the bracing air crowds surge, weaving currents along the sidewalks; street-cars, motors, trucks, wagons, congest the street. There is the continuous roar of action; the life-blood of the city pulsates in its great arteries; a static sense of energy is in the air.

Across the foot of LaSalle Street the Board of Trade crouches silent and sphinx-like. Within, from the gallery, I can look down on the concentric rings of the grain pits. Clamoring and jostling in the wheat-pit the brokers are acting their noisy drama. In the hectic signaling of a hundred hands the food of a nation is being bartered, wheat from the world's harvest is being reckoned.

Beyond the loop and the south bend of the river which encloses it, lie to the west the teeming slums; a hundred nations are sheltered in the crowded tenements, a vast caldron of humanity, struggling, seeking, contributing, blending finally into the life-blood of the city.

Lights are shining like square stars high against the sky; there are many who are working late into the early darkness of the night. On the lake front the lines of the boulevard lights gleam against the metallic blue of the sky. Electric signs, scintillating coruscations of color, flash and are gone. The white eyes of motors wink past. Work is ending.

In the hotel lobbies, in dining-rooms and restaurants, the evening crowd is gathering. In the heavily ornate dining-rooms of the great hotels which loom above the avenue there are dinner parties, the smooth curves of women's shoulders, lights, flowers. In marble corridors the crowds are gather-

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ing. A stringed orchestra is playing above the splash of a fountain and the high chatter of voices. On Clark Street a hundred saloons glare with light and warmth. Each to his own.

Against a few low drifting clouds the yellow glare of the steel-mills flickers and disappears. The moon has risen above the lake; cold and clear, it touches the barren waste of the park. Yellow shine the lights of the boulevard. Taxis and scattered motors and stray couples, hurrying somewhere, pass and are gone.

JOSEPH HUSBAND.

The German Losses

WHEN I was at the front at Dannemarie in Alsace last June, I asked the usual question of the commander of that sector of the French line, General Legros, "How long do you think the war will last?" His reply, as I remember the words, was this, "Il faut les tuer tous."—They (the Germans) must all be killed.

As it is the opinion—in which I share—of a great many men, soldiers and civilians, that the Allies can only defeat the Germans when the Germans have suffered sufficient losses on the battlefield, the statistics of those losses are of considerable interest. These statistics and their analysis I owe in main to "F. F." the military critic of the *Journal de Genève.*

According to the German census of 1910 (Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich, 1914), that portion of the male population of the country born between the years 1870-1895 inclusive, and reaching the age of military service between the years 1890-1915 inclusive (viz., of ages from 20 to 45 in 1915) was as follows:

(1) Active list
Born 1888-95 inclusive .....4,870,820.
(2) Landwehr
Born 1876-87 inclusive .....5,996,876.
(3) Landsturm
Born 1870-75 inclusive .....2,485,668.
Total available for army up to and including the year 1915 .....13,353,364.

From this the following deductions must be made:

(1) For deaths between April 1, 1910, and August 1, 1914.

The average rate of deaths in Switzerland for men between 20 and 45 is about 9 per thousand per year. In four years and three months that would amount to about 38 per thousand. To be on the safe side, let us call the German rate of deaths 33 per thousand. This would account for 450,000 deaths, from April 1, 1910 (the date to which the census was compiled) as far as August 1, 1914 (when the war began).

(2) Deduction must be made for those men rejected by the army as unfit. German recruiting figures are as follows:

Fit .....55.5 per cent
Fit (2nd class) .....24. per cent
Adjourned as unfit .....14.3 per cent
Unworthy ..... .2 per cent
Absolutely refused ..... 6. per cent

The question now arises what figure must be deducted for those who become unfit between the ages of 20 to 45, in addition to the 6 per cent refused as unfit at the age of 20. No German statistics being at hand, "F. F." falls back on Swiss statistics, and using these as a basis, adds 19 per cent to the original 6 per cent, thus coming to the conclusion that about 25 per cent of the population of Germany is unfit for military service between the ages of 20 to 45.

Using these figures we must deduct 25 per cent of 13,353,364—say 3,340,000 men.

(Note: The 19 per cent which "F. F." deducts is by no means an arbitrary figure. He finds that 2 per cent is retired in Switzerland during the time of the service schools, and declares that in spite of Switzerland's well known record for good health, it is never possible to maintain 75 per cent of the male population fit for military service. A deduction of 25 per cent for the Germans is not high).

(3) There must also be deducted those serving in the navy (150,000), the government railroads (740,000), telegraphs and postal service (320,000), government clerks, police, munitions workers, coal miners, etc. "F. F." calculates this whole number at 1,800,000 men. Therefore, from the total male population available on August 1, 1914,—13,350,000—we must deduct:

(1) Died ..... 450,000.
(2) Refused or retired as unfit.....3,340,000.
(3) Public service .....1,800,000.

leaving at Germany's disposal at the beginning of the war 7,750,000 men. Now we come to the losses.

The official German report, dated July 31, 1915, issued in September, gave losses as follows:

309 Prussian lists (including Baden) ....1,740,000.
715 Lists of other German States ..... 900,000.

2,640,000

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A glance at these figures will show that either the Prussian losses ought to have been more, or the Saxon, Bavarian, Würtemburg losses less, since Prussia and Baden include three-quarters of Germany's military strength. However, let us pass the government figures; less 33 1-3 per cent slightly wounded and returned to duty, we have definite, final losses of 1,760,000 men for twelve months, or 146,666 men a month.

From another source "F. F." estimates the German losses at 2,400,000 men, exclusive of 700,000 men returned to the front, or 200,000 losses a month. From still another source the estimate is 135,000 losses a month.

Personally, I am inclined to calculate the German definite losses at about 150,000 a month, including navy losses, prisoners, and deaths from all causes in the army. At any rate, according to their own reports 135,000 a month are the minimum German figures, and I prefer the estimate of 150,000. At that rate, up to November 1, 1915, the Germans have lost 2,250,000 men in fifteen months. They should therefore have on that date 5,500,000 men at their disposal, as against 7,750,000 on August 1, 1914.

Their armies, including guards of communication, on all fronts are estimated by "F. F." at about 4,000,000 men. This leaves 1,500,000 men still available for making losses good, a force which would be used up, at the rate of 150,000 men a month, by September 1, 1916. But adding to this force the class of 1916, about 520,000 men (650,000 less 25 per cent for death and disability), the Germans can continue at their present strength until the campaign of the year 1917, which may see the beginning of the phase of "résistance désesperée," as "F. F." puts it.

"F. F.," relying on the more sanguinary character of the war as it is now being waged, relying also on the lower quality of the last German reserves, believes that the early summer of 1916 will mark the beginning of that phase. Kitchener once said that the war would last three years. A statistician on an American trade weekly devoted to the interests of oil, using Civil War figures, came to the same conclusion. (Incidentally he said the oil wouldn't give out). At any rate, there is reason to believe that the only resources which Germany cannot apparently replace—the resources of men—are not inextinguishable.

This war is not going to be settled in the Balkans or on the Suez Canal. It is probably going to be settled in Belgium, where it began, or perhaps on the River Rhine. And I think the English are the ones who will finally settle it. For France, Austria and Russia are losing men in a proportion not greatly different from Germany. Great Britain's losses alone, immense though they are, are infinitely less (about 500,000 to October 1, 1915). Slowly and stubbornly, but thoroughly and bravely England is learning the art of modern war in the hard school of experience. Her forces are intact. The morale of her armies is serene and strong in the face of blunders, as it has ever been. Is it too much to hope that a Marlborough or a Wellington will rise again? Is it too much to hope that in 1916 or 1917 the mettle of her advancing troops will be felt again on the battlefields of Ramillies and Malplaquet and Waterloo?

GERALD MORGAN.

VERSE

In Church

High on the altar candles stand
  And lift aloft their lights to Him;
  The altar candles' lights are dim,
I see them glimmer through my hand.

Outside the fierce white sunlight throws
  Its strength upon the colored glass,
  And strives in vain to break and pass
The barrier of blue and rose.

The choir boys all stand and sing,
  Their voices rise, their voices fall,
  And high above them on the wall
The blurred and broken sunbeams cling.

Those beams that once were pure, instead
  Are daubed and colored by the saint
  That smiles down in her glass and paint
From the arched window overhead.

If this, then, be a place for prayer,
  I pray you, saint, relax your smile,
  And though but for a little while,
Take the red halo from your hair.

Drop your blue robe down to the floor,
  And all in white step to one side,
  Then fling your gaudy casement wide,
Like the great portals of a door.

The surging sunlight in will press,
  Like joy, like strength, like a grand hymn,
  The puny candles, grown more dim,
Will vanish into nothingness.

ALICE DAMROSCH PENNINGTON.

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Urashimataro

I dream a dream of sea delight:
Sea-stars, sea-fields, and blue sea-hills
That downward plunge through purple night,
Where fish go past with gleaming gills
In meteor flight;
Each strange sea-sight
My restless eyes with wonder fills.

A sea-cave lost to sun and star
Lies smooth like jade about my feet,
Where luminous, pale creatures are
Like giant flowers, wanly sweet—
Yet once I walked
And idly talked
With idlers, in the village street.

Close to the shore I left my boat,
Nor knew I why I sought the sea—
Her great gongs beat a glorious note
Sounding the wistful heart of me;
My temple gongs
Sang poorer songs—
I could not listen to their plea.

Kanamiki, long ago
I loved you in the lantern-light,
Because your throat was drifting snow,
Because your eyes were stars of night;
Your image white
Has fled my sight,
Now that around me no winds blow.

But there is one with emerald scales
Who sings forever in my ears,
Her violet hair, like clinging veils,
Wraps me about and drowns my tears;
With wreathing arms
She lulls and charms
Vague questions and forgotten fears.

And you, my village, you were fair
Where sounded flute and samisen,
But all your gods, they brought despair
And never happiness to men!
What was Japan?
A sword, a fan,
A mountain, pictured by a pen?

I still remember light of day,
Though here blue twilight steeps the eyes,
For time no longer fleets away,
And ocean chanting never dies:
What was the earth?
Since my sea-birth,
I, like the child, am inly wise.

Then let me dream of sea-delight,
Sea-stars, sea-fields, and blue sea-hills,
Where in a realm of purple night
A sea-queen all my thinking stills:
The sea began
The earth for man,
The sea creates, and the sea kills.

FREDERIKA PETERSON.

One Captive

"And she, a nursling of captivity,
Knew nought beyond those walls, nor what such change might be."

It was not that she begged,
She did not plead;
Though blind men might have guessed
Sufficient need.

She shivered as she stood
In His white snow,
Her hands, poor little things,
Blue-cold, I know.

Mittens are cheap to give,
And clothes; not this
Stole my smooth fur-lined warmth,
My well-fed bliss.

But that she seemed to ask
No better thing;
Had her ears never heard
A dream-bird sing?

No dancing vision filled
Expectantly
Her eyes. They knew no more
Than poverty.

M. E. CROCKER.

The Rug-Weaver

From his sunny corner in the Syrian quarter
The old rug-weaver walked eastward slowly.
"I wish to see the Temple," he said,
"Where these strange foreigners worship God."
He came to the iron gate of Trinity churchyard,
He wandered past the graves of the forgotten Americans,
Sleeping peacefully these hundred years.
Through the great bronze doors he passed
And came into the quiet church,
With its wealth of amethyst, amber and gold
Streaming through the stained windows.

"But where are the worshipers?" he asked,
For the church was empty.
"They neglect their God, these strange foreigners," he said.

Still further eastward he took his way.
None noticed him in his shabby clothes.
He passed along Wall Street.
"Everyone is going somewhere in a hurry," he said,
"Perhaps they are going to prayers.
"I will follow them!"
With the crowd he entered the Stock Exchange.
He saw the mad rush of the brokers,
He heard them shouting.
"This must be their Temple," he said.
"So they worship God, after all,
"These strange foreigners,
"But in a strange foreign way."

ROBERT GILBERT WELSH.

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After the Play

NOT the most interesting play produced in New York last week, but the most interesting event—that is about my notion of "Overtones," by Alice Gerstenberg, given at the Bandbox by the Washington Square Players.

Miss Gerstenberg, who is young, lives in Chicago, and has dramatized "Alice in Wonderland," has not told the public, so far as I know, how her play first suggested itself. One guesses that she may have hit upon it in the form of a question—why not embody, incarnate, anthropomorphize the subconscious?

Wherever she began, she ended by choosing to incarnate the self which we are fully conscious of and as consciously wish to hide, and whose promptings are strictly relevant to what we are saying and hearing.

Not many years ago, when Harriet was a young woman, she fell in love with a portrait painter who loved her. Because he was poor she threw him over, and married a rich man she did not love. The painter married Margaret, and they are happy in desperate poverty. Margaret comes to see Harriet by appointment. What Harriet hopes to gain by this interview is an opportunity of seeing the painter often and winning his love again. She wants also to emphasize the fact that she is rich and to hide the fact that she is unhappy. Margaret's object is to save her husband and herself from starvation by getting an order. She wants also to emphasize her happiness and to hide her poverty.

Miss Gerstenberg has brought these two women together, and two more—the suppressed self of each. Harriet can hear and see her own suppressed self, and Margaret hers. We, the public, can see and hear both of them as each prompts the woman it is suppressed by. We hear the insistent "Tell her we have an automobile" repeated to Harriet. We hear, as plainly as Margaret hears, the hungry raving cry, "We are starving." In the end the invisible is seen, the inaudible is heard, and the suppressed selves fly at each other like dogs.

"Overtones" is amusing, now and then exciting, interesting all the time. It is also odd, and not quite odd enough, not quite inventive enough. When once you have grasped Miss Gerstenberg's formula you cease to be surprised. A certain deductive unimaginative literalness prevents your surprise from being renewed and kept going.

But the formula itself, I believe, is new. It is obviously of importance to the stage. It points the way to other new things. Miss Gerstenberg's success will incite other dramatists to try their hands at plays in which the suppressed self is also at moments the irrelevant, and we shall be the richer by droll scenes of contrast between what a man says and the superficially unrelated things he is thinking about. Perhaps some dramatist, master of a more learned and curious art, and working with a producer who knows the use and value of the half-light, will even persuade the subconscious to appear above the threshold.

And suppose you had written a play with scenes in which the things your characters thought were more significant than the things they said. Suppose you were earnestly desirous of having your audience attend with unaccustomed divination to these unspoken thoughts. What better prelude could you wish, what apter preparation, than a curtain-raiser made after Miss Gerstenberg's recipe?

Now you know what I mean when I stop November 8th, 1915, as it goes by, and tell it not to forget it was the birthday of "Overtones" at the Bandbox.

Of course we could easily get too many plays about the self-consciously suppressed or about the subconscious. It is equally true that we are never likely to get enough one-acters as good as two of the other three plays given by the Washington Square Players. "Literature" is the one short play most likely to please people who like Schnitzler and people who usually don't. "The Honorable Lover" is Bracco at his best, isn't it? Mr. Ralph Roeder's translation of "The Caprice" reveals a fine sympathy with Musset's use of words. And the sets? They make you wonder how long the people who prefer realism in all stage settings will stay a majority.

"The Great Lover," given at the Longacre and written "by Leo Ditrichstein and Frederic and Fanny Hatton," is a play sure to please everybody and a few other people. It begins behind the scenes of an opera house, in the manager's office, where there is a most amusing babel of egos, all shameless and clamorous. Into this turmoil comes Mr. Ditrichstein as Jean Paurel, composed, correct, very urbane, monocled, grayhaired, awfully well turned out. Petulant he is a moment later, when the manager crosses him, but cool in his petulance and witty. When he makes love to order he does it with a proper spirit, with none of that weary acquiescence in routine which gave feature to the hero of "The Concert." He treats the younger generation, when it knocks at his door, to a demonstration of candor in jealousy, and the demonstration has a real beauty of candor. Here, and at many other points, the play rises out of its class, giving the character of Jean Paurel a human likable variety which must be a result of fineness in observation. He is winning in his vanity, and he is many other things. Mr. Ditrichstein plays the part flexibly, with color and fineness, and lightly where lightness is needed. So, you think, it might have been played by a Richard Mansfield who had cured himself of the trick of being sinister. Mr. Ditrichstein is extremely good even when the play turns to pathos of a dismally familiar brand. Near the end it is sticky with renunciation. But at the very end there is a wholesome touch of tart cynicism. The play is well worth seeing for its sheer amusingness, for the much-above-the-average delicacy with which Jean Paurel's character is modeled, and for Mr. Ditrichstein's acting. Its pathos can be borne best by those whose memories are shortest.

Miss Grace George is not only a comedian skilled to disguise her nicest calculations as engagingly fresh impulses, nor only a good producer and good manager. She is a sound judge of revivable plays for the Playhouse. "The New York idea" is an American classic. Time has done less harm to "The Liars" than to anything else by Henry Arthur Jones. Its moral outlook is upon a world in which you say to the husband, "If your wife is beginning to love another man take her to a restaurant and let the dinner be good"; to the wife, "If you run away with another man nice people will cut you and you'll have to live on the Continent in second-class boarding houses"; and to the other man, "Give her up, your country needs you." But this moral outlook seems no older now than in 1898, when "The Liars" was first given here. The 1840 moral code for married persons was as quaint in 1898 as it is in 1915. All that seems older in the play is a slight elaborateness in some of the speeches, and the presence of a raissonneur, Sir Christopher Deering. The art of story-telling on the stage is always new, and how many living writers understand this better than Mr. Jones? Within two minutes after the play begins it has already lost the air of beginning. How easy it all sounds and is not!

Q. K.

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A COMMUNICATION

A Pacifist's Apology

SIR: I do not know Mr. Robert Herrick; but I know the author of "The Common Lot,'" and "The Master of the Inn," and what he says greatly concerns me. I have listened therefore with sympathetic attention to the "Recantation of a Pacifist," and I am wondering how much of it I ought to believe. I am a pacifist myself; at the beginning of this war my pacifism was mild and moderate, but with every month it has grown more radical and more irreconcilable; the one lesson I have learned is the insanity of militarism. It does not seem to me now that I shall ever be able to unlearn that lesson, but one must never shut the door on conviction; if I had been living in France for the past six months should I have been ready to recant my pacifism?

I can easily see that much must have happened in France since the war began which would lead one's mind in that direction. I have just been reading "The Market Place," in Romain Rolland's "Jean Christophe," and the merciless realism of that study of Parisian life and character convinces me that something had to happen in France. When such a Frenchman as Romain Rolland gives us a picture like that of his own country, one feels that the day of judgment must be near. The witnesses agree that the war has brought to France a great awakening. I am ready to believe what Mr. Herrick tells us: "Even to-day, in the crisis of struggle, there is not a Frenchman who will not tell you of the immense good that has already come to his people, that will come increasingly from the bloody sacrifice. It has united all classes, swept aside the trivial and the base, revealed the nation to itself. The French have discovered within themselves and shown to the world qualities unsuspected or forgotten of chivalry, steadiness, seriousness, and they have renewed their favorite virtues of bravery and good humor." Surely these are great gains; let us not minimize them. Out of the horrible wrongs, perfidies, hates, agonies, desolations of this war, France has gleaned all the good. It is reassuring to know that the Providence who overrules all our perversities is able, after this fashion, to make the wrath of man praise him.

Mr. Herrick makes one luminous comment: "I have cited France rather than any other of the warring countries, because I have seen the French in their trials, and because outside of Belgium I believe that France has the clearest record of all in this war. Hence has come to her the greatest reward. For in order to reap blessings of war a nation must have an irreproachable cause." Indubitably! No such renewal and ennoblement could have come to the life of France if there had not been a clear national consciousness that her quarrel was just, that she was fighting not only for her own existence, but to lift the world to larger and freer life.

What, then, must be true of those who are fighting to cripple and destroy her? What must be the effect upon their lives? It seems tolerably clear that in such a deadly conflict as this, one side or the other must be in the wrong. And if praise and honor are due to those who give their lives for justice and liberty, what shall we say of those who take the lives thus nobly given? If the cause of one nation is irreproachable, the cause of the other nation must be execrable. And if the one nation is exalted by the struggle, the other just as inevitably is degraded and corrupted. And this is true, no matter what may be the issue of the conflict. "'Tis not what man does that exalts him, but what man would do." And so of nations. We must never celebrate the gains of the nations which have been fighting on the side of the angels, without taking full account of the losses of those which have been fighting on the other side. In making up our estimate of any war, both results must be reckoned.

I am not unaware that some incidental benefits may come to the nation which is fighting on the wrong side. The people in the ranks may be confused and misled; they may be made to believe that wars of aggression are wars for the preservation of their national life, and patriotism may unite and inspire them to heroic deeds and sacrifices; but the eternal verities cannot be forever concealed, and the reaction upon the national life of predatory policies can hardly be averted. Whatsoever a nation soweth that shall it also reap. The three nations that strangled Poland have suffered in their life and character ever since, and the retribution is not yet fully paid. The mills of the gods are still grinding.

This is why I am a pacifist. I am unable to see that war is or can be anything other than a curse. I can see that gains sometimes accrue to one side, but the losses to the

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other side—nay, to both sides—more than balance them. It may be sweet and beautiful to die for one's country, but to kill for one's country is neither sweet nor beautiful. I could be willing many times over to give my life for my native land, but to kill my brother man—no; that does not invite me. There is, there must always be, a better way for nations to settle their disagreements than by killing one another. War is the quintessence of unreason; it is the reversal of the nature of things; it is a social solecism. Its motive and mainspring is hate, and hate is not good for men or nations.

Let me also deprecate Mr. Herrick's imputation to the pacifists of a soft sentimentalism which is oblivious to the crimes and curses of the existing social order. Not many of the pacifists whom I know are of that way of thinking. It isn't best to make sweeping statements about those whose opinions differ from our own. Most of those who agree with me in this matter I have found to be quite willing to face the facts of life and to deal with them heroically. We know that goodness sometimes means severity, and that the regimen which we may neither refuse for ourselves nor deny to others may involve sharp discipline and suffering. Only so that it is rationally administered by those who have the common good in view, we shall not protest. But we have our doubts whether using human beings freely as "cannon food" has much tendency to lessen the demand for them as "factory food" or "mine food," or "sweat-shop food"; and we are unable to see how the dulling of our sensibilities toward the slaughters of war is likely to quicken our sense of the inhumanities of peace.

It would be indeed an impotent conclusion if we should abolish international war and leave industrial war still raging; and I for one have no strong expectation of the disappearance of either except as the result of the recognition of the primal law of human brotherhood which would make short work of both of them. I am not despairing about that, either, even in these days. For the number is growing of men like "The Master of the Inn," who know that there is no other way for men to live together. He was a pacifist, without fear and without reproach. And I don't want Mr. Herrick to recant anything which he has told us about him, for in the "fundamental principles" which he incarnated there is more to bring a better civilization than in all the armaments that ever were built.

WASHINGTON GLADDEN.

Columbus, O.

CORRESPONDENCE

French General Staff at Fault

SIR: In her interesting review of "Sur la Voie Glorieuse" in THE NEW REPUBLIC of October 2nd Miss Elizabeth Shepley Sergeant says: "If M. France will see nothing ahead but smashing victory, that is perhaps because he realizes that he himself was influential in defeating a military program that might have made it conceivable." I cannot imagine to what military program Miss Sergeant refers. Anatole France certainly joined in the opposition to the Three Year Service law, but that law unfortunately was not defeated and it disorganized the French army without securing any advantage; it was not merely useless but pernicious. The only military program that I know of which might have made victory conceivable and which was not adopted is the program set forth by Jaurès in that remarkable book, "L'Armée Nouvelle," which the present war has justified in almost every detail. M. France was certainly not influential in defeating the program of Jaurès, in which he firmly believed.

I fancy that Miss Sergeant has been led into error by the attempts of the French General Staff and its apologists to put the responsibility of its own blunders on other shoulders. The General Staff had, most unfortunately, an absolutely free hand as regards the military program, and being mainly composed of men of the type of those who organized defeat in 1870—men who had learned nothing and forgotten everything—it made almost every blunder that it was possible to make. The organizers of the French army seem to have believed that the principles and methods of warfare were settled once and for all in the time of Napoleon I, and that no change could possibly be made in them. Civilians—Mr. H. G. Wells, for instance—had foretold the trench war, but the French General Staff ridiculed these fantasies of mere *pékins* and spurned the suggestion that a French soldier could be asked to "hide himself in a hole in the ground." The failure to make trenches was one of the causes of the disastrous defeats of Charleroi and Morhange. The General Staff held the theory—which was the basis of the Three Year Service law—that the Germans would make a sudden attack with their active army only—the conscripts actually under the colors—and bring up their reserves later, so that the first decisive battles, on which, according to the theory, the result of the war would depend, would be fought by armies of a few hundred thousand men. This theory led naturally to the conclusion that the reserves were of only secondary importance and that everything depended on the number of men permanently under the colors; it has, of course, been completely disproved by the present war, which has justified the theory of Jaurès that the reserves—the nation in arms—are the decisive factor. The General Staff persisted in the theory that the Germans would make their main attack on the eastern frontier, and concentrated the whole French army on that frontier even when the German troops were already in Belgium; Jaurès held that the Germans would make their main attack by way of Belgium. The General Staff held as a matter of faith that it was impossible for the Germans to enter France north of Maubeuge and therefore left the region of Lille entirely undefended so that General von Kluck marched through it practically without opposition; Jaurès held that the region of Lille was of great importance and consistently but vainly urged both in Parliament and in print that that region and the northern frontier in general should be adequately defended. The General Staff held the theory that the French army must take the offensive at once and acted upon it with disastrous results at Charleroi and Morhange; Jaurès held—and common sense seemed to support him—that an army that had to meet an attack made by invading forces greatly superior in numbers should begin by remaining on the defensive and draw the invaders on by successive retreats, tiring them by repeated engagements, to entrenched positions carefully chosen and fortified beforehand, where a stand should be made. Moreover he specifically mentioned the offensives that were afterwards actually taken, in order

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to warn the General Staff against them. In short, as one of the most intelligent officers in the French army said to me not long ago: "We have had to unlearn everything that we were taught at the École de Guerre and learn from the Germans how to make war."

The "politicians" were convenient scapegoats. It has been asserted that the "politicians" refused to vote sufficient money for the army and that it is their fault that France was not prepared for war. There is not the smallest foundation for this assertion. France has spent as much money on military preparation as Germany, if not more, and Parliament has never refused a sou that was asked for by the General Staff. On the contrary, the General Staff has refused money offered by Parliament. In 1911 the Caillaux Ministry, on the initiative of M. Caillaux himself, asked for a grant of 240 million francs ($48,000,000) for heavy artillery for use in the field. Early in 1912, after the Caillaux Ministry had gone out of office, the General Staff persuaded M. Millerand, who had become Minister of War in the Poincaré Cabinet, to withdraw the grant on the ground that heavy artillery was useless in the field and would only hamper the operations of the army. M. Millerand also, at the instigation of the General Staff, removed from the direction of the Ministry of War a General who held the heretical belief in the utility of heavy artillery in the field and replaced him by an orthodox believer in the Napoleonic tradition. No further steps were taken to provide heavy field artillery until 1914, when the Doumergue Ministry, of which M. Caillaux was a member, was in power. The Caillaux Ministry also took steps during its short tenure of office (from June 27th, 1911, to January 14th, 1912) to supply the army with munitions and equipment, which were lamentably insufficient. This matter also was entirely neglected from the advent of the Poincaré Ministry until the accession to power of the Doumergue Ministry in 1914, and the General Staff was primarily responsible for the neglect. During the year 1913 the whole time and energy of the military authorities were wasted on the organization of the three year service, and enormous sums of money were thrown away on new barracks and other expenditure resulting from the change, while the army was left without adequate equipment or munitions and no attempt was made to bring the fortified places up to date or equip them with guns of sufficient range. Toul and Verdun are now almost impregnable, but had they been attacked at the beginning of the war they would have shared the fate of Maubeuge.

The errors of the General Staff have been continued even since the war began. When, more than a year ago, M. Painlevé, president of the Naval Committee of the Chamber, proposed to bring naval guns from the coast and mount them on gun-carriages for use in the field, his proposal was treated with contempt by the military authorities, who at last adopted it only after he had persevered in it for about two months. Until June the Director of Munitions at the Ministry of War was a General who believed only in 75-mm. guns and opposed the supply to the army of heavy artillery and even of rifles. The Army Committees of the Senate and Chamber had been demanding his dismissal for months. The records of those committees are a history of obstruction on the part of the military authorities not only to every new proposal but even to the supply of material essential to the conduct of the war. Orders for munitions that had been given by the Army Committees were countermanded by the military officials at the Ministry of War. The production of munitions was not seriously organized until its control was taken from the mili-

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tary authorities and handed over to a civilian Under-Secretary of State, M. Albert Thomas, Socialist Deputy. The sanitary service of the army was not organized at all until the parliamentary committees took it in hand; the treatment of the wounded was becoming a public scandal and causing grave discontent.

It is not too much to say that if France has been saved from defeat, she has been saved by the politicians and in spite of the military authorities. If France was not prepared for war, the military authorities and they alone are to blame. But they were convinced before the war that France was so well prepared that she could beat Germany single-handed, and they believed when the war broke out that the Allies would easily beat Germany in a few months. Unfortunately they succeeded in inducing certain eminent French statesmen to share their delusions; and that is perhaps one of the reasons why there was war.

ROBERT DELL.

Paris, October.

Woman's Equality in War

SIR: It is a significant fact that the first statue to be erected in England since this war began is to the memory of a woman who was neither a "wife" nor a "mother," but an individual capable of heroism and of devotion to an idea. It is not necessary to take seriously the recent outburst of sentimentality in the English and American press over Miss Cavell's fate. It is only another red herring drawn across the trail of the woman movement. The slaughter of lads of seventeen and eighteen, too young to recognize the principles at stake, is an infinitely greater proof of the "barbarity" of war than is the execution of a woman fully cognizant of what her action entailed. Moreover, the recognition of woman's responsibility for offenses against the state is no innovation "made in Germany." They have never been exempt from the penalties attendant on political action and opinion, and they do not desire to be so. During our Civil War a woman was hanged for conspiracy, though the charge against her was never so clearly proven as in the case of Miss Cavell. At the time of the French Revolution women as well as men died for their political opinions, and it is on record that they met their death as bravely as their brothers. Russia has not the habit of pardoning Nihilists because they happen to be of the female sex, and English queens and would-be queens have suffered on the scaffold as well as English kings. Neither can it be said that during the recent agitation for the vote women in England were treated more gently than male political offenders. The conclusion forced upon us is that our "pastors and masters" do not fear that political penalties or death will unsex us. It is political power and life that will prove our undoing.

NANCY TURNER POPE.

Denver, Col.

Night Courses for Women

SIR: It will no doubt prove of interest to your readers to learn that Miss Adelaide M. Schulkind, of 1354 Fifty-seventh Street, Brooklyn, has started a movement to have the proper authorities permit women to take advantage of the evening courses at City College. All interested may communicate with Miss Schulkind, who will be more than willing to give any information desired.

G. Z.

Brooklyn, N. Y.

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